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I. INTRODUCTION
Ned Foley has performed a great service in thinking through how Bush v.
GoreI might be applied in the future.2 It is an especially helpful enterprise
given that the case and the election it decided are still prominently in the
minds of the public as well as the legal community. Foley's task of divining
Bush v. Gore's future is both invited and discouraged by the decision itself.
The case invites a great expansion of election law litigation by relying on the
broad principle of equal protection. 3 If the Florida Supreme Court's ordered
recount violated equal protection norms by allowing different recount
practices in different counties, 4 should not this principle be extended to the
many other aspects of elections? Why should states permit differences across
counties in voting machines, polling place location, voting by mail practices,
polling hours, etc.? But Bush v. Gore couples this invitation to broad
application of equal protection to election practices with an explicit
discouragement that the case is about a particular set of facts and has little or
no precedential value. 5
Foley's task is to navigate through this Scylla and Charybdis and sort out
where courts might rely on Bush v. Gore, where they might not, and why. He
accomplishes this in three ways. First, he provides a thoughtful taxonomy of
cases that are working their way through the legal system. 6 Second, he looks
at the psychology of the Court's willingness to take on Bush v. Gore cases. 7
Third, he thinks through how the individual justices might apply Bush v.
Gore.8
Through all of this, Foley educates his reader, raises many important
issues, and unveils nuances in the Court's psychology, but he only hints at
something that I will say more directly: Bush v. Gore is not likely to be a
precedent for much at all.
The reasons for the bleak future of Bush v. Gore are in the text of the
decision itself, several factors lying behind the scenes in Bush v. Gore, and
* Fellow, American Enterprise Institute.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
2 Edward B. Foley, The Future of Bush v. Gore?, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 925 (2007).
3 See Bush, 531 U.S. at 104.
4 Id. at 105-06.
5 Id. at 109.
6 Foley, supra note 2, at 930-46.
7 Id. at 946-64.
8 Id. at 964-76.
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the impracticality of expanding a decision to the field of election law, which
is almost by definition characterized by diverse election practices among-
and even within-the states.
II. BUSH V. GORE'S EXPLICIT LIMITATION OF ITS APPLICABILITY
Foley rightly notes that the Court has been unfairly ridiculed for
attempting to limit the application of equal protection to other election law
cases. 9 It is, however, worth laying out exactly what the Court says in
applying equal protection in Bush v. Gore.10
The key articulation of the circumstances that have triggered the equal
protection claim is that "[t]he recount process, in its features here described,
is inconsistent with the minimum procedures necessary to protect the
fundamental right of each voter in the special instance of a statewide recount
under the authority of a single state judicial officer."'
Taken literally, the Court means to limit the equal protection claim to the
"special instance" when there is a statewide recount ordered by a court and
where it can be shown that there are diverse recounting procedures in various
jurisdictions. 12
This limited set of circumstances is confirmed in other parts of the
opinion where the Court raises the question "whether the recount procedures
the Florida Supreme Court has adopted are consistent with its obligation to
avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its electorate.' 13
Likewise, the Court answers its own question: "The recount mechanisms
implemented in response to the decisions of the Florida Supreme Court do
not satisfy the minimum requirement for nonarbitrary treatment of voters
necessary to secure the fundamental right" to vote. 14 And again:
[W]e are presented with a situation where a state court with the power to
assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount with minimal procedural
safeguards. When a court orders a statewide remedy, there must be at least
some assurance that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and
fundamental fairness are satisfied. 15
9 Id. at 932.
10 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
I Ild. at 109.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 105.
141d.
15Id. at 109.
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The Court stressed several times that the Florida Supreme Court had the
power to order a statewide remedy regarding the recount. 16 But with that
power comes a responsibility of equal treatment statewide. The Court even
implied that the Florida Supreme Court could have gotten it right with
"substantial additional work," although it found that there was no time to do
that additional work. 17
In addition to the limitation of the circumstances that Bush v. Gore
would apply to statewide judicial recounts, the Court distinguished these
circumstances from the broader question of "whether local entities, in the
exercise of their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing
elections."'18 The Court was clear that this larger question about variability of
election practice among local entities is not before the Court, so it did not
render judgment on the matter. 19 However, the Court did note a positive
reason for such variability: that it might be warranted because of special
"expertise" local entities would have in conducting elections in their area.20
The Court's distinctions, the positive description of local expertise, and the
ubiquity of differences in election administration among local entities are a
great contrast to the special circumstances under which the Court extended
equal protection in judicially sanctioned statewide recounts.
III. LURKING BEHIND EQUAL PROTECTION: POST-ELECTION
PROBLEMS
Further bolstering the text of the opinion's limitation of the scope of
Bush v. Gore's application in other cases are two concerns with the special
problem of election procedures in the aftermath of elections. Simply put, the
Court attempted to limit the applicability of Bush v. Gore to post-election
equal protection issues,21 and this limitation is not as arbitrary as it may at
first seem. First, while the per curiam opinion did not adopt the argument that
the Florida Supreme Court had effectively and illegitimately changed the
pre-existing election scheme, 22 that argument lurks in the background of the
equal protection claim, making it much stronger in cases of post-election
issues. Second, there is an additional argument that the Court did not make,
but that is consistent with the limitation of its equal protection logic to post-
16 Bush, 531 U.S. at 105, 110.
17 See id. at 109-10.
'
8 1d. at 109.
19Id.
20 Id.
21 See id. at 110.
22 Bush, 531 U.S. at 113-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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election matters: changes in election procedure that occur during the
counting of the vote are more susceptible to partisan pressures than those
made before the election.
IV. How REHNQUIST'S CONCURRENCE HAD AN EFFECT ON THE
COURT'S DECISION ON BUSH V. GoRE
In Bush v. Gore, the Court was presented with another argument as to
why it should overturn the Florida Supreme Court's statewide recount. The
plaintiffs presented-and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas accepted-the argument that the Florida Supreme Court's actions
would have constituted a change in the election scheme that the legislature
had enacted before the election and thus might, against the wish of the
legislature, endanger Florida's ability to have its presidential electors counted
in the Electoral College. 23
While the per curiam opinion relied on equal protection grounds, the
argument in the Rehnquist concurrence about changing the legislative
scheme and the problem of adopting new procedures post-election does have
some resonance in the opinion.24 This lends further support to the notion that
the Court saw the equal protection grounds as especially compelling and
applicable in the post-election context.
The gist of the argument is that the Constitution gives the state
legislature the power to determine the method of selecting presidential
electors. The Constitution provides "[e]ach State shall appoint [electors], in
such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct .... -"25 The primacy of the
state legislature in selecting the electors is evident in several other ways.
State legislatures commonly selected electors directly without a popular
election in the early presidential elections after the adoption of the
Constitution.26 South Carolina continued the practice until the Civil War, and
there were even later examples of legislatures selecting electors in the
extraordinary case when a state joined the Union shortly before a presidential
election.27
But if the legislature does not directly appoint electors, it is primarily
responsible for establishing the electoral scheme in law. 28 The Electoral
23 Id.
24 See id. at 108-09.
25 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
26 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 28-33 (1892).
27 JoHN C. FORTIER, AFTER THE PEOPLE VOTE 4 (John C. Fortier ed., AEI Press 3d
ed. 2004) (1983).
28 McPherson, 146 U.S. at 27.
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Count Act, which lays out procedures for the counting of electors, gives
primacy to electors selected under election laws passed prior to the election,
but disfavors electors selected by some law or contest provision that is
established after the election:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed
for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any
controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the
electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures ... such
determination shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated,
so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such State is
concerned. 29
The Electoral Count Act established a framework for states to get their
official slate of electors in to federal authorities so that their votes would be
counted by Congress.30 It established the "safe harbor" provision-relied on
in the Bush v. Gore per curiam opinion-favoring the counting of the votes
of electors whose names are finalized by six days before the meeting of the
electors and are appointed under pre-existing law. 31 Indeed, the Electoral
Count Act included such a provision in order to avoid the difficulties that
arose in the 1876 election when state recounts were again at issue.32 The
problems in 1876 were in several states, and in some cases involved
competing governments or competing branches of governments submitting
different slates of electors. 33 Clearly, the point of requiring states to adopt an
electoral scheme in advance was to avoid post-election shenanigans.
Slates of electors picked in advance of a specified date and under pre-
existing law should be counted. The plaintiffs argued that the Florida
Supreme Court had disregarded the pre-established law and effectively
established a new one in its rulings on altering the contest period and
ordering a statewide recount.34 By effectively changing the law after the
election, the Florida Supreme Court endangered the counting of the Florida
electors.
29 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 See Eric Schickler et al., Safe at Any Speed: Legislative Intent, the Electoral
Count Act of 1887, and Bush v. Gore, 16 J.L. & POL'Y 717, 733-35 (2000); John W.
Burgess, The Law of the Electoral Count, 3 POL. SC. Q. 633, 638-39 (1888).
33 Norman J. Omstein, Three Disputed Elections: 1800, 1824, and 1876, in AFTER
TIlE PEOPLE VOTE (John C. Fortier ed., AEI Press 3d ed. 2004) (1983).
34 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000) (per curiam).
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The per curiam opinion does not adopt this line of thinking, but it does
on several occasions take up the Rehnquist opinion's worry about the Florida
Supreme Court changing pre-existing election law. First, the per curiam
opinion accepts that the Florida legislature intended to meet the December 12
"safe harbor" deadline for the appointment of electors, and it relies on that
fact to end the possibility of a properly structured recount going forward
because the time was too short.35 If change from pre-existing law were not a
problem for the Supreme Court, it might have allowed the Florida Supreme
Court to proceed on a different timeframe, and the Florida Supreme Court
might have found that missing the "safe harbor" deadline was a necessary
evil in order to conduct a fair recount. But the opinion stuck to the
legislature's earlier judgment on the matter. 36
Second, the per curiam opinion discusses the case of Palm Beach County
switching its standard several times during the recount process on what
should be considered a legal vote.37 While the example is supposed to
support the equal protection claim that standards might vary "not only from
county to county but indeed within a single county from one recount team to
another," the thrust of the example is to show the destabilizing effect of the
change from pre-existing law.38
The Court did not decide Bush v. Gore on the grounds laid out in the
Rehnquist concurrence, but the concern with post-election changes to
election procedures is prominent in the equal protection argument of the
Court, adding support to the Court's attempt to limit Bush v. Gore's
applicability to the post-election context.
V. POLITICAL MANEUVERING AND POST-ELECTION CHANGES
TO PROCEDURES
One additional reason the Court might have relied upon to limit its equal
protection reasoning to post-election recounts is the grave problem associated
with self-interest of vote counters in a standardless post-election
environment. As a general matter, the post-election period is more
susceptible to self-interested parties changing standards to benefit their
favored candidates. In most cases, a decision by vote counters in a manual
recount is determinative of the vote. If, in examining a ballot, vote counters
decide that it reflects a voter's intent to vote for Al Gore, then the vote will
be tallied for Al Gore. In the case of a manual recount, the judgment of those
making the determination as to the status of the vote might be colored by the
35 1d. at 111.
36 1d.
37 Id. at 106-07.
3 8 Id. at 106.
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political preferences of the counter. This might be true on a ballot-by-ballot
basis or on the more general decision of what standard to use in counting
ballots.
Pre-election procedures might also be subject to manipulation by self-
interested parties. A lack of standards or overly broad discretion might lead
to such manipulation. But in the case of pre-election issues, the connection to
an increased number of votes is more speculative than in the post-election
recount scenario. Take, for example, a county that had discretion as to how to
apply a photo ID law to its residents. If the dominant political party believed
that strict enforcement would benefit their candidates, then they might adopt
such a strict standard. But the connection of this standard to the number of
votes cast is much more uncertain in the pre-election period. The people
discouraged from voting by the ID rule might likely come from both parties,
albeit in different numbers.
In the post-election recount scenario, the number of votes separating the
candidates will likely be known, and this may increase the pressure to bend
standards or adopt new ones in order to "find" a few more votes. In the pre-
election period, there may be estimates about the closeness of the race, but
the exact margin between two candidates cannot be known with any degree
of certainty. Thus, interested parties do not know how many votes will be
needed to put their favored candidate over the top.
While unequal application of standards prior to the election can have bad
effects, they are magnified in the post-election contest. Clearly, the public
and the Bush and Gore supporters worried very much about this aspect of
recounts, and the partisans of both sides made the argument that the other
side was bending the rules to squeeze out a few more votes. The Court does
not cite this reason for the importance of equal standards in a recount
situation, but it is nonetheless an important distinguishing characteristic
between pre- and post-election procedures that fits well with the Court's
limitation of its equal protection logic.
VI. WHY A GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL PROTECTION WOULD BE
UNWORKABLE AND INCONSISTENT WITH ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION IN AMERICA
One last major argument against a broad application of Bush v. Gore's
equal protection language is that election administration in the United States
is extremely diverse and decentralized. States have very different modes of
holding elections, and states frequently allow their local jurisdictions to have
great leeway in the policy, planning, and administration of elections.
A broad application of equal protection would be difficult to administer
and would ultimately push toward uniformity of election practices within
states and likely across states. While advocates of such uniformity might
10572007]
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applaud this move, it cannot be over-emphasized how large the change
would be and how states and localities with particularized and popular
practices would resist such change.
Take the logic of the equal protection argument to its extreme and nearly
every difference among jurisdictions in their administration of elections
would fall by the wayside. Take, for example, such mundane practices as
polling place hours. The New Hampshire primary begins with the tiny town
of Dixville Notch, voting after the clock strikes midnight on election day,
while residents of other towns cannot vote for several hours. 39 This unequal
treatment of voters seems insignificant, but might make it easier for some
residents to get to the polls than others.
The State of Washington is just one example of a state whose counties
have varying practices on voting by mail.40 A number of counties have
moved to a system of essentially all-mail voting, in which residents are
mailed their ballots and do not go to polling places on election day. Other
counties in the state have a mixture of election day polling places and mail
ballots. Texas has widespread early voting at polling places, but the
accessibility to and participation in early voting vary widely from county to
county.41
Many states have different voting machines in different counties. Local
jurisdictions themselves have different voting machines at different precincts.
Local jurisdictions may have different voting machines for different
purposes, such as precincts that have a voting machine of one type that is
most accessible to disabled voters and other machines that are used for voters
without disabilities. Counties sometimes employ different counting machines
at the precinct and countywide level so that ballots cast in the same way are
counted on different types of machines depending on whether they were cast
at local precincts or mailed or dropped off at the county seat.42
Several counties in the State of Colorado have introduced vote centers,
which do away with small precincts in favor of a system in which any voter
can cast his or her particular ballot at a number of supersized and
conveniently located voting centers.43
39 HUGH GREGG & BILL GARDNER, WHY NEW HAMPSHIRE? 42-43 (2003).
40 See generally County Auditors/Election Dept. in WA State,
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/auditors.aspx (last visited Oct. 15, 2007);
ELECTIONLINE.ORG, ELECTION PREVIEW 2006: WHAT'S CHANGED, WHAT HASN'T AND
WHY (2006), http://www.electionline.org/Portals/1/Publications/Annual.Report.Preview.
2006.Final.pdf.
41 Robert Stein, Early Voting, 62 PUB. OPINION Q. 57, 69 (1998).
42 ELECTIONLINE.ORG, supra note 40.
43 LARIMER COUNTY, COLO., CLERK AND RECORDER, http://www.co.larimer.co.us/
elections/votecenterstab.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
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The State of California requires that if there are fewer than 250 people
who would need the same ballot style (i.e. the same list of offices and
referenda), then those people will be required to vote by absentee ballot, and
there will be no polling place opened for them.44
Across the states the differences are even greater. Some states have
same-day registration, while others, including Minnesota, are contemplating
actively registering voters rather than requiring voters to register
themselves. 45 Meanwhile, some states, like North Dakota, have no
registration at all.4 6
States have widely differing practices on overseas ballots, including
when they mail them out.47 Some states allow voting by fax.48 The Federal
Voter Assistance Progam has experimented with military overseas voting by
internet.49 This Article will not discuss the more controversial differences
such as different treatment of felon voting rights, provisional ballot
eligibility, and voter identification laws.50
There are hundreds of practices that vary across and within states. Some
are historical accidents, others newly introduced popular reforms. Some are
likely engineered by a political party that believes the practice favors its
candidates. Other practices may be targeted to address the special needs of a
population such as the blind or Native Americans on reservations.
A broad application of equal protection is unworkable. It would require
massive change and it would make it difficult for the courts to make practices
equal on a case-by-case basis. Further, it would likely meet significant
resistance. How, for example, would one assess a voter identification law's
impact if one county had a strict voter identification law, but a very liberal
absentee ballot law that allowed most voters to avoid showing up at the
polling place to show an ID, as opposed to another county that had no ID
requirement, but strictly limited voting by mail? Would the Court compare
apples to oranges and try to equalize as best it could the entire web of
election procedures, or would it drive towards equality in everything?
If federal courts truly wanted to enforce uniformity only within states,
they would face the problem that the courts would have to become intimately
44 CAL. ELEC. CODE § 3005 (West 2007).
45 S.F. 1297, 85th Sess., 1st Engross. (Minn. 2007).
4 6 NCSL VOTER REGISTRATION DEADLINES, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/
elect/taskfc/deadlines.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
47 See generally GREGG & GARDNER, supra note 39, at 39-45.
48 FVAP Voting Assistance Guide, http://www.fvap.gov/services/faxing.html (last
visited Oct. 15, 2007); S.C. CODE § 7-15-460 (2006).
49 FVAP VOTING OVER THE INTERNET ASSESSMENT REPORT,
http://www.fvap.gov/services/voireport.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2007).
50 See Foley, supra note 2, at 930-46.
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familiar with the election administration practices of all fifty states and
carefully watch over state courts and institutions. That administrative
difficulty might lead courts to minimize the differences between states and
push for national uniformity. The Court's limitation of the principle in Bush
v. Gore looks more sensible in light of the unworkability of an unlimited
application of equal protection principles to election administration.
VII. FOLEY'S TAXONOMY
Foley provides a helpful taxonomy of election administration cases
brought before courts that may fall under the equal protection precedent of
Bush v. Gore.51 He usefully distinguishes the types of cases as those that treat
ballots differently because of: (1) insufficiently specified standards, (2) the
failure to follow prescribed standards, (3) state-authorized local discretion,
and (4) variations within local jurisdictions. Foley is generally skeptical of
the prospects for these cases, and rightly so.
He does note that the first category of unspecified standards has the most
in common with Bush v. Gore, for much of the confusion in Florida resulted
from the broad standard of voter intent being the guide for county recounts52
without further central guidance as to how to determine how that intent was
to be determined. Foley might have added that Bush v. Gore also criticized
some aspects of state-authorized local discretion.53 While the State of Florida
may have been guilty of allowing the counties too much discretion, the
Florida Supreme Court in its recount order approved differences in county
practices. 54 The U.S. Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore was critical of the
Florida Supreme Court, for example, for allowing counties to have different
standards on "overvotes" and for allowing counties to submit results with
partial recounts. 55
The trouble with all of the principles articulated in the taxonomy is that
they are quite broad. If equal protection were extended to all circumstances
where there are inadequate standards, then this argument could be applied to
buying voting machines, implementing voter identification policies, mailing
out absentee ballots, or nearly any other election practice. Each of the four
principles in the taxonomy explains a way in which a county may end up
with a different treatment of ballots from another county. But the unequal
treatment of ballots due to "insufficiently specific state rules" is a subset of
5 11d. at 932-45.
52 Id. at 933-34.
53 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 107 (2000) (per curiam).
54 Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1228-29
(Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
55 SeeBush, 531 U.S. at 108-10.
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equal protection claims in a sense, 56 yet still a principle that could
conceivably be invoked against many election practices. The Court's
limitation of the equal protection principle in Bush v. Gore to post-election
statewide recounts is much narrower than any of these four broad areas.
The one subject discussed in Foley's taxonomy that might have some
resonance with the Court is the issue of provisional voting. The larger issue
of whether states should count out-of-precinct provisional ballots will likely
be a significant policy issue in state legislatures. The issue that has generated
the most controversy is the question of whether provisional votes cast by
eligible voters who vote in the wrong precinct should be counted. It is not
clear that this controversy is particularly likely to be resolved by the courts,
as the Help America Vote Act essentially authorized states to use either a
strict or loose policy on the counting of provisional votes out of precinct.
But on other matters regarding provisional ballots, the Court might find
itself faced with the same post-election discretion issues that it did in Bush v.
Gore. Provisional ballots could be crucial to an election outcome, and they
will be litigated after the initial election results are known. Wide variations
within a state on policy regarding the counting of provisional ballots,
especially those based on on-the-ground discretion of local officials, would
have the feel of a recount.
Foley discusses the controversial Washington State gubernatorial
election with respect to the problem of provisional ballots.57 He imagines a
scenario where the post-election squabbling over rejected absentee and
provisional ballots leads to a statewide court-ordered recount. There he sees
identical circumstances as in Bush v. Gore, and he raises the question of
whether we would need almost exactly the same fact pattern as Bush v. Gore
for the Court to again intercede on the same grounds.58
Even with the limited understanding of the Bush v. Gore precedent put
forward in this piece, one can still imagine the Court applying its precedent
in a slightly broader set of circumstances. Take Foley's example of
Washington State, with counties using different standards on the rejection of
provisional and absentee ballots amid the post-election jockeying of both
political parties in a razor-close election. One could imagine that the Court
might intervene as it did in Bush v. Gore if another entity other than a court
ordered a statewide recount ratifying these different procedures, or if a
government entity with the power to step in did not step in even in the face of
egregious bending of the rules by the counties. In these instances, the post-
election jockeying combined with loose standards and a close margin have
56 Foley, supra note 2, at 932-45.
57 Id. at 934.
5 8 Id. at 955-56.
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enough of the feel of the atmosphere in Florida in the aftermath of the 2000
election to make the Court consider intervening.
VIII. FOLEY ON WHETHER THE COURT WILL TAKE UP BUSH v. GORE
In discussing how a case relying on Bush v. Gore might make it to the
Supreme Court, Foley is again skeptical that the Court will employ Bush v.
Gore as a precedent in the near future 59 and has some doubts about the
longer-term future as well. 60
Perhaps the most promising avenue that Foley identifies for Bush v. Gore
being addressed by the Court is his scenario of a circuit court or more than
one circuit court using Bush v. Gore as a precedent to strike down a popular
state election practice. 61 Either because the Supreme Court felt that the
circuit court had gone too far or because of a conflict between circuits, the
Court might be compelled to step in and stress the limited character of the
precedent. But even such a narrowing might have the unexpected result of
fleshing out more of the details of the limits of Bush v. Gore and might
encourage litigation within those limits.
Given the Court's limitation of the equal protection principle in Bush v.
Gore, Foley rightly argues that the Court is unlikely to look for opportunities
to expand the equal protection principle to other areas of election law.62
Foley also thoughtfully considers how the Court might avoid taking on such
cases even in the case of circuit conflicts or overreaches. 63 Nonetheless, a
circuit court applying Bush v. Gore in a broad manner to strike down a
popular or longstanding election practice in a state might pique the Court's
interest. And even though the intention of the Court might be to limit the
reach of Bush v. Gore, by ruling on its limits, the Court might clarify certain
areas where the precedent would have life.
IX. FOLEY ON INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Foley's discussion of the Bush v. Gore dilemmas is nuanced and
balanced. Justices who did not join the decision might be more inclined to
support the general principle of equal protection, but perhaps less likely to
support the decision of Bush v. Gore itself as a precedent. Similarly, Justices
who might be the most likely to limit the reach of equal protection might
5 9 Id. at 976-80.
6 0 Id. at 980-85.
61 Id. at 973-74.
62 Foley, supra note 2, at 991-92.
63 Id. at 977-83.
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come to the defense of Bush v. Gore, although the Justices' defenses might
emphasize its narrow character.
The two most interesting speculations about the future decisions of the
Justices are Foley's thoughts on where the new Justices will end up and how
the likely author of Bush v. Gore, Justice Kennedy, will view his handiwork
in the future.64 On the former point, Chief Justice Roberts's emphasis on
incremental change and his willingness to decide matters on a case-by-case
basis would point to him retaining a narrow view of the applicability of Bush
v. Gore. Foley at times suggests that Roberts's espoused judicial restraint
would lead to a very cautious application of Bush v. Gore to new
circumstances. 65 But Foley also argues that Roberts's judicial modesty and
his explicit statements during the confirmation process might persuade him
to work hard to keep the precedent of Bush v. Gore alive. Given the thicket
that the Court would likely enter if it broadly applied Bush v. Gore, Roberts
seems more inclined to embrace Foley's former description than his latter.
The case of Kennedy is more complicated, as Foley notes. Foley lays out
a range of possibilities, including the option that Kennedy will feel some
pride of authorship and will not want to see a case of such prominence not
employed as precedent. 66 This, however, assumes that Justice Kennedy
wants to see an expansion of the principle of equal protection and that he is
unhappy with its limitations. From the text of the opinions and the Pandora's
Box this pride of authorship would open, it is more likely that Justice
Kennedy is pleased to have a narrow precedent for Bush v. Gore even if that
means that the case will rarely come into play.
X. CONCLUSION
Ned Foley's "The Future of Bush v. Gore?" is a helpful road map for the
course of election litigation, the future of the Court and its Justices' opinions
on Bush v. Gore, and generally a sober assessment of the case's prospects.
The Court is unlikely to go back on its own explicit limitation of the
reach of Bush v. Gore. That is not to say that before Bush v. Gore rears its
head again as a precedent it will once more require the perfect storm of a
disputed presidential election, hanging on one close state, where election
jockeying and differences among counties is pre-empted by a court-ordered
state recount that blesses these differences. But the Court might employ Bush
v. Gore as a precedent in a closely contested post-election scenario, in
decisions reining in circuit courts who exuberantly apply Bush v. Gore to
64 Id. at 973-73.
65 Id. at 971-72.
66 Id. at 972-73.
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strike down state election practices, and in modest ways that would fit with
the moderation of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy.
With a case of such prominence and with such an important outcome, it
is tempting to assume that it will have wide applicability. But Foley's outline
of the possible outcomes shows a more modest future. Bush v. Gore will be a
case for the history books, but it will not likely be the case that paves the way
for wide-scale reform or centralization of election reform practices.
